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Store Names Information Signalling: A Credibility Perspective 
This study is about store names as brand signals. Using the framework of Erdem and Swait (1998), 
hypotheses are developed regarding the effects of store names on consumers' expected product utility. 
It is relevant to study store names as brand signals because store names can act as additional signals in 
the consumer purchase decision process. The study focuses in particular on the effects of store name 
credibility on perceived risk, infofmation costs and perceived product quality. The hypotheses will be 
tested on data that are currently being collected in a survey among two hundred students. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Branding is a core construct in marketing and a vast literature has developed on branding, brand equity 
and related concepts. However, in this literature, brands are mostly conceived as referring specifically 
to product names. Little attention has been paid to store names as brand names, and in particular store 
name credibility seems under-researched. As Burt and Sparks (2002) argue, within most of the work 
on branding, retailing is "conspicuous by its absence" (195). This is surprising as clearly many 
products are traded through branded retail outlets and many consumer purchase decisions are made 
within a retail store, making not only product choice conditional on store choice but also providing the 
consumer with an additional brand signal when making this final purchase decision. 
This paper follows the conceptualisation of customer~brand equity as proposed by Erdem and Swait 
(1998) to explore the brand equity of retail store names. Adopting an information economics 
perspective, we wish to explore how the credibility of a store influences customer bran~ equity. Our 
project focuses especially on conditions where store names and product brand names can both act as 
signals that consumers can use to infer the credibility of the brand (product) promise. The present 
paper discusses the case where only store names are present and for this case proposes hypotheses 
based on an extension to a retail contextofErdem and Swait's (1998) framework, which in turn draws 
from signalling theory (e.g. Spence, 1973; Stigler, 1961). The paper will outline an empirical study 
f~r which the data collection is currently underway. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. We will first review relevant literature on branding and store 
names and then review the concept of credibility. We will then further discuss Erdem and Swait's 
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(1998) paper in light of our application to the study of store names and present our hypotheses. We 
will next outline the methodology of our ongoing empirical study and conclude with a section 
discussing further research and implications. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Branding and store names 
The value of branding has been recognised for long time by academicians and practitioners. Branding 
provides a number of utilities to both consumers and companies. Consumer brand equity represents 
''the value (to a consumer) of a product, above that which would result for an otherwise identical 
product without the brand's name" (Leuthesser, Kohli and Harich, 1995: 57). One stream of the 
marketing research on brand equity (see e.g. Aaker, 1991; Keller, 1993) centres on consumer's brand 
association. In this respect, brand equity may be viewed as the outcome oflong-term investments 
designed to build a sustainable, differential advantage relative to competitors. This perspective of 
brand equity is embedded in cognitive psychology and its focal point is the consumer cognitive 
process. 
However, another stream of research has built on signalling theory and substantiated building 
credibility as the principal function of consumer-based brand equity (see Erdem and Swait, 1998). 
Brand investments contribute to credibility by signalling that when a branded product fails to fu1:fi1 the 
promise expressed in the brand signal, the brand compromises the expected returns on these brand 
investments as well as its reputation for delivering on its promises. Ifbrands damage their credibility 
they cannot co~and the premium associated with their reputation and brand investment (Erdem and 
Swait, 1998). This approach has recently been further developed and fruitfully applied to several 
product categories (cf. Erdem and Swait, 2004; Swait and Erdem, 2004) but not to store names. 
Indeed, while these conceptualisationS of equity are valuable in explaining customer preference and 
perceived value for particular brands of products, Dorsch and Carlson (1996) noted that many of the 
same brands are found in competing retailers. In such circumstances product brand names are no 
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longer a differentiating factor upon which consumers may infer product quality, as the intrinsic value 
given by a brand name would be the same irrespective of the store it is sold. The authors argue that in 
such situations, for instance, service becomes more important in determining customer value. Store 
names may also directly influence the perceived value of a product. Aaker (1992) suggests that 
knowing that a piece of jewellery came from a store like Tiffany can affect the experience of wearing 
it. The users can actually feel different because of Tiff ants perceived quality and associations. Hence, 
as any other brand, store names can communicate unobservable quality and influence choice by 
serving as a proxy for unobserved attributes, or by possessing an inherent image that consumers 
demand (Sullivan, 1998). 
The importance of branding in retailing relies on store image. In this respect, the literature has 
highlighted a few distinctions between product brands and store image. According to Christensen and 
Askegaard (2001) ''image'' refers to the total impression an organisation makes on its various 
audiences. It helps people to think about a brand abstractly rather what they think the brand actually 
does. Keller (2001) further argues that brand imagery denotes more intangible aspects of the brand as 
it deals with the extrinsic properties of the product or service, including the ways in which the brand 
attempts to meet customers' psychological or social needs. The retailing literature however seems to 
have mainly focused on the store image construct without interpreting store image as a brand signal 
(see e.g. Mazursky and Jacoby, 1986; Thang and Tan, 2003). 
As we argued previously, in many cases the same branded products are found in competing retailers. 
Hence, product brands are no longer an exclusive signal of product quality and consumers may rely on 
other signals, including the store name, to maximise their product utility. We further note that the 
literature referring to the credibility of brands as products (cf. Erdem and Swait, 1998) implicitly 
assumes that credible brand names are sold through credible retailers. However, this assumption is not 
per se founded as the assurance that a store will sell the real brand and not a brand fraud relies upon 
the credibility of the store itself. The New York .Times (2003, Jun 28) reports for instance that a 
Northern District Court of Georgia has ruled that Goody's Family Clothing. an US based retailer, will 
have to repay Tommy Hilfiger, a renowned designer of casual clothing, US$11 million for selling 
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counterfeit T-shirts and look-alike jeans. Furthermore, the assurance given by a store in regards to the 
promised services on which most retailers compete (i.e. product return policy, extended product 
warranties, delivery time, etc.) also depends on the credibility level of such store name. These ideas 
have however not been systematically studied in the literature. Our study therefore aims to contribute 
to gaining a better understanding of the role of the credibility of store names as brand signals in the 
consumer purchase decision making process. 
CredibHity 
In surveying previous marketing research, we note that while the concept of credibility has been 
extensively referred in marketing communication and advertising (e.g. Grewal, Kavanoor, Fern, 
Costley and Barnes, 1997; Joseph, 1982; Lohse and Rosen, 2001), credibility has not been fully 
investigated in the branding literature. Although the importance of ethos or source credibility is not 
controversial, the nature of this perception has become so. Aristotle envisioned ethos as composed of 
three elements: intelligence, character and goodwill (McCroskey and Teven, 1999: 90). Similarly 
Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) saw source of credibility as composed of three elements: 
expertness, trustworthiness and intention toward the receiver. Source credibility has its roots in social 
psychology (see Hovlan.d et al., 1953; Hovland and Weiss, 1951-1952). Its claim is that sources 
revealing expertise and trustworthiness are credible and, to that degree, persuasive (McCracken; 
1989). Expertise is defined as the perceived ability of the source to make correct assertions. 
Trustworthiness refers to the perception that the stated assertions are considered valid by the source 
(Hovland et al., 1953). 
Credibility refers to the judgments made by the recipient about the source's knowledge on a particular 
topic and the believability of information provided by that source (McCroskey, Hamilton and Weiner, 
1974). Credibility resides in the eye of the beholder (Infante, Rancer and Womack, 1997). Recipients 
have been revealed to be more open to communication from sources they recognise to be credible than 
to others (McCroskey et aI., 1974). More pertinent to our study, however, is the perspective of 
credibility as investigated in information economics. Because the consumer is typically unable to a 
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priori observe the quality of a product, the consumer needs to rely on signals sent by, in our case, a 
retailer. 
The information economics view on brand equity, in contrast with cognitive psychology, focuses on 
the imperfect and asymmetrical information of the product and/or its market (Erdem and Swait, 
1998). Asymmetric episodes derive from opportunistic behaviours ensuring that information is kept 
undisclosed in pursuit of vested interests (Molho, 1997). Because of the consumer's inability to a 
priori observe the quality a product, the consumer needs to rely on signals sent by, in our case, a 
retailer. Spence (1973) defined signals as observable attributes attached to the (signal) transmitter that 
are subject to manipulation by himlher/it (i.e. the educational level of a job applicant that can be 
altered by him/her) as opposed to indices that are observable unalterable characteristics (i.e. race and 
gender are unalterable attributes), 
In transactions between buyers and sellers, when buyers are unable to ascertain the actual quality of 
the product prior to purchase, and sellers are fully informed, a situation of asymmetric information 
subsists (Akerlof, 1970). Darby and Karni (1973) argue that "incomplete information on the part of 
the individual consumer creates favourable conditions for fraud" (72). Kinnani and Rao (2000) reveal 
that two types of information problems exist: adverse selection or hidden information and moral 
hazard or hidden action. Adverse selection problems take place when one of the two parties, prior to 
an economical transaction, is uncertain about the claims that the other party makes regarding its ability 
to fulfil contractual obligations. For instance, a consumer may be aware that some products (i.e. jeans) 
are sold by a specific retailer, but he/she may be uncertain about the ability of a retailer to carry all 
sizes, colours, styles, etc. In adverse selection conditions the unobservable quality does not change 
from one transaction to the other. 
Moral hazard problems, instead, arise when one party, prior to an economical transaction, is not 
certain about the intentions of the other party. For instance, a consumer may be afraid that after the 
purchase of a product, should the product be defected, the retailer will not conform tQ the promised 
product return policy advocated prior to the purchase. In moral hazard conditions the vendor can 
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change product quality from one transaction to the next. While moral problems may be resolved by 
incentives, adverse selection situations may be resolved by signalling (Kirmani and Rao, 2000). 
The literature advocates that signalling can be an effective counteragent to information asymmetry as 
it can help consumers to make choices in unfavourable selection conditions (cf. Mishra, Heide and 
Cort, 1998). Signalling games rely upon the credibility of the signals, that is, if anyone is able to send 
a signal, it mislays the effectiveness of the signal itself. The game theoretic literature presents 
beneficial insights into the nature of the equilibria in signalling games (see Riley, 2001 for a review 
in information economics; Spence, 1973), and these have direct repercussions for the credibility ofthe 
signals entailed. 
A separating equilibrium subsists when there is at least one signal which is inexpensive enough, 
relative to the potential gain, for credible signallers to send but which is too expensive, relative to the 
potential gain, for deceiving signallers to send. For example, if we consider the context of 
credible/non-credible retailers: assuming that the gains of sending the signal (i.e. selling a product), 
denoted B, are the same for both types of retailers, and representing the cost of the signal to a credible 
retailer by ST and the cost of the signal to an non-credible retailer by Su the following cost 
relationships must hold for a separating equilibrium: B -ST > 0 and B -Su < 0 (Lee, Ang and 
Dubelaar, 2005). 
Further, this information must be evident to both parties: signal senders as well as signal receivers. 
The equilibrium that evinces from the above scenario is)dentified as a "separating" equilibrium 
because the signal perfectly discerns the credible and the non-credible retailers - that is, it is highly 
trustworthy. Sending the signal clearly transmits the message that the retailer is credible; and, under 
these conditions, not doing so noticeably communicates the opposite significance. This is because it 
does not pay a non-credible retailer to mimic a credible one by sending the signal; given that all non-
credible retailers will not send the signal, any credible retailer, not wishing to be misinterpreted for a 
non-credible one, will have, instead, an incentive to send it Hence, an equilibrium takes place 
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because, once the retailers of both kinds have selected their strategies (to conveyor not to convey the 
signal), they have no motivation to change them. 
Similarly, Erdem and Swait (1998) advocate that a brand signal is composed of a firm's past and 
present marketing mix strategies associated with that brands. That is, a brand becomes a signal 
because it embeds a firm past and present marketing mix strategies. Therefore, a brand or an 
organisation's reputation may be used as a signal of unobservable quality (see Spence, 1973). Chu 
and Chu (1994), for instance, have given an example of renting another agent's reputation when one's 
reputation is not large enough to signal quality. Using an econometric model, they s}1owed that in a 
"maximally separating equilibrium" high product quality manufacturers distribute their products 
through reputableretailers1, while low quality products manufacturers distribute through retailers with 
However, their research does not provide empirical validation. Furthermore, in a previous study, 
Yoon, Guffey, and Kijewski (1993) using business insurance service data, tested the proposition that a 
company's reputation and its service offering information collectively determine a buyer's 
expectations. The authors found evidence that expectations, reputation, and information affect buying 
intention. The literature also suggests (see e.g. Raj, 1985) that a positive reputation is likely to yield 
stronger and more resilient market share positions and that a manufacturer's reputation ameliorates 
distributors' trust and loyalty (cf. Anderson and Weitz, 1989). In a later study focusing on product 
brand names, Erdem and Swait (1998) extend the conceptualisation given in Chu and Chu (1994) and 
assert that the credibility of a brand is affected by the clarity of a brand, the consistency of a signal and 
brand investments. The clarity of a brand refers to the absence of ambiguity in the information 
transmitted by the brand's past and present marketing mix strategies and derived activities. The 
consistency of the signal signifies that a signal must agree and be logically coherent with the 
marketing mix strategies as well as to the conformity of mix elements to the objectives to be achieved 
1 The reputable retailer is defined as the one who has made a nonsalvageable investment (i.e. advertising, store 
logo, nonsalvagable portion of store decoration) of Twhich it wiIllose should the consumer stop buying from it 
A reputable retailer is one with high reputation bond (Chu and Chu, 1994: 179) 
2 A retailer who has not made a nonsalvagable investment (i.e. discounters). 
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(Shapiro, 1985). Brand Investments denote that the resources spent by firms on their brands assure 
that promises are maintained. Furthermore, firms make brand investments to exhibit commitment to 
their brands (Klein and Leffler, 1981). Investments in brand strategies and activities (i.e. brand logo, 
sponsorship, or a powerful advertising campaign) are sunk costs that cannot be recuperated. 
Hence, when a branded product fails to fulfil the promise expressed in the signal, the brand 
compromises the expected returns on these brand investments as well as its reputation for delivering 
on its promises. Erdem and Swait (1998) suggest that brands thatdamage their credibility than cannot 
command the premium associated with their reputation and brand investment. The authors also argue 
that the utility given by the credibility of a brand, firstly, decreases perceived nsk: perceived risks 
exist as "any action of a consumer will produce consequences which [s/]he cannot anticipate with any 
approximating certainty, and some of which at least are likely to be unpleasant" (Robertson, Zielinski 
and Ward, 1984: 184). Previous research has examined various types of perceived risk, including 
financial risk, performance risk, physical risk, psychological risk, and social risk (cf. Jacoby and 
Kaplan, 1972). Secondly, it increases perceived quality: Cognitive psychological research on brand 
equity underlines how brands affect product quality. Thirdly, it increases information costs saved: 
Consumers incurs cost when gathering information to reduce uncertainty and perceived risk. 
These costs are manifested in various ways: i.e. expenditure of time, money, psychological costs, 
sensory costs and information processing costs. Finally, there is consumer expected utility: the specific 
levels of perceived risk and information costs also influence consumer's expected utility. Multi-
attribute utility theory suggests that consumer's expected utility depends on brand's perceived 
physical/functional/symbolic attributes and consumer taste (see also Erdem et al., 1999). Erdem and 
Swait (1998), using a signalling perspective, demonstrated that in imperfect and asymmetrical 
markets, a brand name serves as a powerful signal of quality when consumers are uncertain about 
product attributes (as in the case of "experience products," (Erdem and Swait, 1998: 134». 
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HYPOTHESES 
Our aim is to test to what extent Erdem and Swait's (1998) framework will hold when transferred to a 
retail context. That is, we wish to test if their model applies for store names as brand signals. We 
therefore derive the following hypotheses from the model, recapitulating the viewpoints developed 
from the literature review in the previous section, which suggested that the model can be readily 
transferred to situations where consumers have information about the names of the stores through 
which products are traded. 
• HI: Credibility of a store name signal increases with (a) the level of store name investments, 
(b) the level of consistency, and (c) the clarity of the store name signal. 
• H2: Clarity of a store name signal increases with the consistency of the store name signal. 
• H3: Perceived risk decreases with (a) the credibility and (b) the clarity of the store name 
signal. 
• H4: Information costs saved increases with (a) the credibility and (b) the clarity of the store 
name signal. 
• H5: Information costs saved decreases with the perceived risk associated with a store name. 
• H6: Perceived quality ofa store name increases with (a) the credibility and (b) the clarity of 
the store name signal. 
• H7: Consumer expected utility associated with the image ofa store increases with the level of 
(a) perceived quality of a store name and (b) the information costs saved from knowing the 
store name, and decreases with (c) perceived risk.· 
METHODOLOGY 
We are currently conducting an empirical study to test the effects of store name credibility on 
consumer purchase decision making. The study measures consumer utility of product purchases from 
specific stores and will be used to assess to what extent perceived service quality, information cost 
saved and perceived risk mediate the effects of store name credibility on this utility. A sample of200 
students is being asked to assess the credibility of a range of store names from four selected product 
categories: jeans, gym shoes, pocket cameras and wrist watches, which are all relevant categories for 
students {cf. Ang, Dubelaar and Boon-Chye, 2001; Erdem and Swait, 1998; Oppewal and Leung, 
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2000). We use scales similar to the ones used by Erdem and Swait (1998) but include some additiolliJl 
items to better capture perceived service quality (according to Garvin, 1988) and information costs 
saved (according to Moorthy, Ratchford and Talukdar, 1997). 
As Erdem and Swait (1998) note, the most important issue in this type of research is the degree to 
which brands/store names attributes are imperfectly observable because the effect of imperfect 
information creates perceived risk and the need for more information. We therefore expect the impact 
of credibility on expected utility via perceived quality and perceived risk to differ between the four 
product categories. The data analysis will focus on testing the hypotheses listed above. Additional data 
collection will focus on obtaining similar measures for product brand names. This will allow 
comparing product brand name effects with store name effects within each of the product categories. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that store names can act as brand signals to consumers when they make their 
purchase decisions. Based on the branding literature, in particular the work by Erdem and Swait . 
(1998), we developed hypotheses concerning the effects of store name brand investments, clarity and 
consistency on store name credibility. Credibility in turn affects perceived product quality, information 
costs, and perceived risk and, through its effects on these constructs, impacts on consumer expected 
product utility. These hypotheses will be tested on data that are presently being collected. 
While the conceptualisation of our proposed model is not new per se, we believe that the suggested 
extension can be beneficial in determining that the signalling theories, which have been demonstrated 
to work for product brand names, may be applied to a retail setting and help to better recognise the 
role of store names as brand signals. A better understanding of the role of store names in the consumer 
decision process will help retailers to make better decisions about the strategic management of their 
stores, in particular in how to develop brand equity through their store names and store formats and 
how to leverage the brand equity that is imbedded in the names of their stores. 
10 
REFERENCES 
Aaker, DA (1991) Managing Brand Equity Capitalizing on th~ Value of a Brand Name. New York, 
NY: The Free Press. 
Aaker, DA (1992) "The Value of Brand Equity." Journal of Business Strategy Vol 13 No 4 pp 27-
32. 
Akerlof, GA (1970) "The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 84 No 3 pp 488-500. 
Anderson, E and Weitz, B (1989) "Determinants of Continuity in Conventional'Industry Channel 
Dyads." Marketing Science Vol 8 No 4 pp 310-323. 
Ang, L, Dubelaar, C, and Boon-Chye, L (2001) "To Trust or Not to Trust? A Model ofIntemet Trust 
from the Customer's Point of View." In 14th Bled Electronic Commerce Conference. (Eds.) 
O'Keefe, RM, Loebbecke, C, Gricar, J, Pucihar, A, and Lenart, G, Bled, Slovenia, pp 40-52. 
Burt, SL and Sparks, L (2002) "Corporate Branding, Retailing, and Retail Internationalization." 
Corporate Reputation Review Vol 5 No 2/3 pp 194-212. . 
Christensen, LT and Askegaard, S (2001) "Corporate identity and corporate image revised - A 
semiotic perspective." European Journal of Marketing Vol 35 No 3/4 pp 292-315. 
Chu, W and Chu, W (1994) "Signaling Quality by Selling Through a Reputable Retailer: An Example 
of Renting the Reputation of Another Agent." Marketing Science Vol 13 No 2 pp 177-189. 
Darby, MR and Karni, E (1973) "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud." The Journal 
of Law and Economics VoJ 16 No April pp 67-88. 
Dorsch, MJ and Carlson, L (1996) "The transaction Approach of Understanding and Managing 
Customer Equity." Journal of Business Research Vo135 pp 253-264. 
Erdem, T and Swait, J (1998) "Brand equity as a signaling phenomenon." Journal of Consumer 
Psychology Vol 7 No 2 pp 131-157. 
Erdem, T, Swait, J, Broniarczyk, SM, Chakravathy, D, Kapferer, J-N, Keane, M, Roberts, JH, 
Steenkamp, J-BEM, and Zettelmeyer, F (1999) ''Brand Equity, Consumer Learning and 
Choice." Marketing Letters Vol 10 No3pp 301-318. 
Erdem, T and Swait, J (2004) "Brand Credibility, Brand Consideration, and Choice." Journal of 
Consumer Research Vol 31 No 1 pp 191-198. 
Garvin, DA (1988) Managing quality: the strategic and competitive edge. New York: Free Press. 
Grewal, D, Kavanoor, S, Fern, EF, Costley, C, and Bames, J (1997) "Comparative versus 
noncomparative advertising: A meta-analysis." Journal of Marketing Vol 61 No 4 pp 1-15. 
Hovland, CI and Weiss, W (1951-1952) "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication 
Effectiveness." Public Opinion Quarterly Vol 15 No Winter pp 635-650. 
Hovland, CI, Janis, IL, and Kelley, HH (1953) Communication and Persuasion. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
Infante, DA, Rancer, AS, and Womack, DF (1997) "Introduction to studying communication." In 
Building communication theory. Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, IL, pp 3-35. 
Jacoby, J and Kaplan, LB (1972) "The components of perceived risk." In Proceeding of Third Annual 
Conference of the Association for consumer research. (Ed.) Venkatesan, M, Association for 
consumer research, Chicago, pp 382-393. . 
Joseph, WB (1982) "The Credibility of Physically Attractive Communicators: A Review." Journal of 
Advertising Vol 11 No 3 pp 15-24. 
Keller, KL (1993) "Conceptualizing, Measuring and Managing customer-based Brand Equity." 
Journal of Marketing Vol 57 No 1 pp 1-22. 
Keller, KL (2001) ''Building Customer-Based Brand Equity: A Blueprint for Creating Strong 
Brands." Working Paper Series. Report No. 01-107. Marketing Science Institute. 
Cambridge, MA 
Kirmani, A and Rao, AR (2000) "No pain, no gain: A critical review of the literature on signaling 
unobservable product quality." Journal 'of Marketing Vol 64 No 2 pp 66-79. 
Klein, B and Leffler, KB (1981) "The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance." 
Journal of Political Economy Vol 89 No 4 pp 615-639. 
11 
Lee, B.c, Ang, L, and Dubelaar, C (2005) "Lemons on the Web: A Signalling Approach to the 
Problem of Trust in Internet Commerce." Journal of Economic Psychology Vol 26 No 5 pp 
607-623. ' 
Leuthesser, L, Kohli, CS, arid Harich, KR (1995) "Brand Equity: The Halo Effect Measure." 
European Journal of Marketing Vol 29 No 4 pp 57-66. 
Lohse, GL and Rosen, DL (2001) "Signaling quality and credibility in yellow pages advertising: The 
influence of color and graphics on choice." Journal of Advertising Vol 30 No 2 pp 73-86. 
Mazursky, D and Jacoby, J (1986) "ExpoIring the Development od Store Images." Journal of 
Retailing Vol 62 No 2 pp 145-165. 
McCracken, GD (1989) "Who is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundation of the Endorsement 
Process." Journal of Consumer Research Vol 16 No December pp 310-321. 
McCroskey, JC, Hamilton, PRo and Weiner, AN (1974) "The effect of interaction behavior on source 
credibility, homophily, and interpersonal attraction." Human Communication Research Vol 1 
No 1 pp 42-52. 
McCroskey, JC and Teven, JJ (1999) "Goodwill: A reexamination of the construct and its 
measurement." Communication Monographs Vol 66 No 1 pp 90-103. 
Mishra, DP, Heide, JB, and Cort, SG (1998) "Information Asymmetry and Levels of Agency 
Relationships." Journal of Marketing Research Vol 35 No 3 pp 277-295. 
Molho, I (1997) The Economics of Information: Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organizations. 
Oxford: BlackWell Publisher. 
Moorthy, S, Ratchford, BT, and Talukdar, D (1997) ''Consumer Information Search Revisited: 
Theory and Empirical Analysis." Journal of Consumer Research Vol 23 No 4 pp 263-277. 
New York Times "Hilfiger Settles Counterfeiting Suit against Retailer." New York Times, pp CA. 
Oppewal, H and Leung, V (2000) "How Brand Names Affect Consumer Store Choice," Paper 
presented at the Marketing in the new millennium: Proceedings o/29th EMAC Conference, 
Rotterdam, Netherlands. (eds.) Wierenga, B, Smidts, A, and Antonides, G.European 
Marketing Academy [CD ROM]. 
Raj, SP (1985) "Striking a balance between brand 'popularity' and brand loyalty." Journal of 
Marketing Vol 49 No 1 pp 53-59. 
Riley, JG (2001) "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling." Journal of 
Economic Literature Vol 39 No 2 pp 432-478. 
Robertson, T, Zielinski, J, and Ward, S (1984) Consumer Behavior. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman. 
Shapiro, BP (1985) "Getting Things Done - Rejuvenating the Marketing Mix." Harvard Business 
Review Vol 63 No 5 pp 28-35. . 
Spence, MA (1973) "Job Market Signaling." Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 87 No 3 pp 355-
374. 
Stigler, G (1961) "The Economics of Information." Journal of Political Economy Vol 69 No 3 pp 
213-225. 
Sullivan, MW (1998) "How Britnd Names Effect the Demand for Twin Automobiles." Journal of 
Marketing Research Vol 35 No Maypp 154-165. 
Swait, J and Erdem, T (2004) "Characterizing Brand Effects on Choice Set Formation and Preference 
Discrimination under Uncertainty." Working Paper. Walter A. Haas School of Business, 
University of California at Berkeley. Berkeley, CA 
Thang, DCL and Tan, BLB (2003) ''Linking consumer perception to preference of retail stores: an 
empirical assessment of the multi-attributes of store image." Journal of Retailing and 
Consumer Services Vol 10 pp 193-200. 
Yoon, E, Guffey, HJ, and Kijewski, V (1993) "The effects of information and company reputation on 
intentions to buy a business service." Journal of Business Research Vol 27 No 3 pp 215-
228. 
12 
